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INTRODUCTION
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VI") 2 is an important tool
in the tool belt of environmental justice advocates. 3 Environmental
justice communities are increasingly turning to Title VI to protect
them from the disproportionate impacts of environmental pollution.4
1. J.D., University of Michigan School of Law; B.A. Cornell University. Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law; Chief Judge, Sault Ste. Marie Tribe
of Chippewa Indians Court of Appeals. I would like to thank Professor Randall Abate for
inviting me to attend Florida A&M University College of Law's Environmental Law &
Justice Symposium in November 2010. Without the support and encouragement of
Professor Abate, this article would not have been possible. I would also like to thank
Quentin Pair for first asking the question that led me to write this article. I must thank my
intelligent and talented research assistant, Melissa Fales, for her contributions to this
piece. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the Florida A&M Law Review for their
assistance with this article.
2. James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 125, 152-53 (1994)
("On July 2, 1964, Congress enacted the most comprehensive civil rights legislation since
the Reconstruction - the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Title VI of the Act, Congress, using
broad and forceful language, prohibits the federal government from financially supporting
any program operated in a racially discriminatory manner .... ").
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
4. Colopy, supra note 2, at 128 ("Recipients determined to be in violation of Title VI or
agency regulations can lose their funding. Since most environmental projects, including
waste dumps, incinerators, and landfills, are heavily underwritten by federal funds,
environmental justice plaintiffs are turning to Title VI to press for injunctive and remedial
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Section 601 of Title VI states that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."5 Environmental justice advocates can therefore use Title
VI to combat the disproportionate impacts of pollution by arguing that
federal funding should not be given, or even rescinded, where there is
evidence that environmental justice communities are unfairly bearing
the burden of increased pollution.6
Environmental justice has its origins in several social justice
movements, including the Civil Rights Movements, the Anti-Toxics
Movement, American Indian struggles,7 the Labor Movement, and the
relief under the Act."). The increasing focus on environmental justice and potential legal
"tools" to address environmental justice concerns is further promoted by the Obama
Administration's focus on environmental justice generally. As evidence of this focus, "[flive
Cabinet Secretaries and senior officials from a wide range of Federal agencies and offices
participated in the first White House Forum on Environmental Justice Wednesday,
December 15, 2010." U.S. Department of the Interior, Obama Administration Convenes
Environmental Leaders at Historic White House Environmental Justice Forum Featuring
Five Cabinet Secretaries (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/press
releases/Obama-Administration-Convenes-Environmental-Leaders-at-Historic-White-
House-Environmental-Justice-Forum-Featuring-Five-Cabinet-Secretaries.cfm. (alteration
in origninal). At this historic Forum, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
Administrator Lisa Jackson was quoted as saying, "[tihe administration has taken
unprecedented steps to ensure that environmental protection reaches every community.
We want to put an end to the days when public health and economic potential are harmed
by disproportionate exposure to pollution." Id. (alternation in original).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (alteration in original). .
6. Richard Monette, Environmental Justice and Indian Tribes: The Double-Edged
Tomahawk ofApplying Civil Rights Laws in Indian Country, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 721,
722 (1999) ("'Title VI itself prohibits intentional discrimination. However, the United
States Supreme Court has ruled that section 602 of Title VI allows federal agencies,
including EPA, to adopt implementing regulations that prohibit unintentional
discriminatory effects . ... Courts have interpreted Title VI to prohibit a broad range of
discriminatory activities including denial of services; differences in quality, quantity, or
manner of services; different standards for participation; discrimination in any activity
conducted in a facility built even in part with federal funds; and discriminatory employment
practices, if the primary purpose of the program is to provide employment . . . . It is
important to note that, under amendments to Title VI made by the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, Title VI applies to all of a recipient's programs and activities. . . .') (citing Dear
Honorable Tribal Leader Letter (on file at University of Detroit Mercy Law Review)).
7. Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of
Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1629-1630 (2007) ("Proponents of the
environmental justice movement during the 1980s and 1990s generally considered Native
Americans to be victims of 'environmental racism,' similar to other racial minorities, based
on their similar history of exclusion, stereotyping, and economic and political
disenfranchisement. Indeed, ample factual support exists for the perspective that Native
peoples live in vulnerable communities, beset by a multitude of hazardous conditions.").
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traditional environmental movement.8 Regarded as catalytic events in
the formation of the environmental justice movement, some activists
point to the 1982 protests against a PCB dump in Warren County,
North Carolina and the publication of the United Church of Christ
Commission for Racial Justice's 1987 study, Toxic Wastes and Race.9
Both of these events and subsequent efforts during the "first genera-
tion of environmental justice claims" were focused on ensuring that
people of color and lower socioeconomic communities did not bear a dis-
proportionate negative impact from environmental burdens and had
equal access to decision making.10 "Environmental racism", the term
originally coined to refer to situations that now correlate to the envi-
ronmental justice movement, was understood to be
[a]n extension of racism. It refers to those institutional rules, regu-
lations, and policies of government or corporate decisions that
deliberately target certain communities for least desirable land
uses, resulting in the disproportionate exposure of toxic and haz-
ardous waste on communities based upon certain prescribed
biological characteristics. Environmental racism is the unequal
protection against toxic and hazardous waste exposure and the sys-
tematic exclusion of people of color from environmental decisions
affecting their communities."1
As the field of environmental justice has grown, it has become
inclusive of several different concepts of "justice". "Environmental jus-
tice, as a field, asks how environmental law fails to further values of
distributive justice, procedural justice, corrective justice, and social
justice."12 Although the disproportionate impacts of environmental de-
cision making remain an important issue for many environmental
justice advocates, what constitutes an environmental justice issue has
expanded throughout the ensuing decades. David Getches and David
Pellow considered what constitutes an environmental justice issue in
light of newly emerging environmental considerations and chal-
lenges.' 3 As they explain, "the ambit of environmental justice issues
8. LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP, 19-30 (New York
University Press 2000).
9. Id. at 20-21.
10. Tsosie, supra note 7.
11. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 5 (Bunyan Bryant, ed.,
Island Press, 1995).
12. Lesley K. McAllister, On Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: A Reply to
Professor Crawford's Review of Making Law Matter: Environmental Protection and Legal
Institutions in Brazil, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 649, 673 (2009) (alternation in original).
13. David H. Getches & David N. Pellow, Beyond "Traditional" Environmental Justice
in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 3-30
(Kathryn M. Mutz, Gary C. Bryner, and Douglas S. Kenney eds., Island Press 2001).
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has stretched well beyond attacking the classically urban problem of
undesirable facility siting and unequal pollution impacts." 1 4
Given "the ambit of environmental justice issues has stretched,"
there is a question of what now constitutes an environmental justice
claim. Ultimately, Getches and Pellow conclude that environmental
justice claims only extend to the claims of disadvantaged communi-
ties. 15 "The definition of the term community connotes some
commonality in interests, backgrounds, occupations, or legal treatment
among people as well as the existence of ties to a particular place."1 6
In addition to focusing on community concerns, modem environmental
justice concerns are those where the inequality faced by the community
intensifies the disadvantages facing the community.17 Accordingly,
modern environmental justice concerns are those facing communities
of color and poor communities where the inequality faced by these com-
munities intensifies environmental disadvantages.1 8
Notably, environmental justice extends to the environmental
inequity faced by those living in Indian country.' 9 Native communities
are environmental justice communities. 20 Land contained within In-
14. Id. at 5-6.
15. Id. at 25.
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at 26.
18. Any "modern" definition of environmental justice must also include consideration
of tribal sovereignty. Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Sovereignty and Environmental Justice in
JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 178 (Kathryn
M. Mutz, Gary C. Bryner, and Douglas S. Kenney eds., Island Press 2002) ("Because justice
for tribal peoples requires support for tribes as distinct political entities, any definition of
environmental justice must include the norm of tribal sovereignty. This is particularly
important because of the paradoxical nature of tribal sovereignty: on the one hand, tribal
sovereignty predates that of the federal or state governments and therefore requires no
validation; on the other hand, as a practical matter the contours of tribal sovereignty are
constantly being negotiated in this country's courts and legislatures. In other words, tribal
sovereignty is sacrosanct yet entirely vulnerable. Its vulnerability calls for vigilant
defense.").
19. 18 U.S.C. §1151 (2006) (Defining "Indian Country," which states that "[elxcept as
otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term 'Indian country', as used
in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,
and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.") (alteration in original).
20. Krakoff, supra note 18, at 162. ("First, virtually all Indian tribes clearly fit into
Getches and Pellow's definition of groups who come to the table with 'palpable and endemic
disadvantage,' stemming from a long history of discrimination, exclusion, and deliberate
attempts to destroy their cultural and political communities. Second, the obvious
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dian country, however, has a unique legal character. Additionally,
Indian tribes possess inherent sovereignty. 21 Despite tribal sover-
eignty, the federal government, and in some instances, individual state
governments, exert a great deal of authority within Indian country.22
In fact, Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have taken steps to limit
American Indian tribal authority. 23 Today, the majority of matters
disproportionate environmental harms borne by Native peoples have meant that they are
already a part of the discussion - to let them continue to be so without a conscious
articulation of the role of tribal sovereignty would be counterproductive to determining
appropriate remedial strategies.").
21. American Indian tribes exist as entities separate from state and federal
governments. A myriad of historical legal developments led to this separateness. American
Indian tribes are extra-constitutional, meaning that tribes exist apart from the American
Constitution. Scholars have noted that "tribal sovereignty is both pre-constitutional and
extra-constitutional." Ann Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, The
Marshall Trilogy, and the United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next
Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 651, 656 (2009)
(citing Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 405, 417 (2003)). In the early 19th century, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
separateness of American Indian tribal nations. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia., the U.S.
Supreme Court held that American Indian tribes were "domestic dependent nations,"
highlighting their separateness from both state and federal governments. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
In Worcester v. Georgia., the U.S. Supreme Court further clarified the separateness of
American Indian tribes, finding that the laws of the states shall have "no force or effect"
within the exterior boundaries of American Indian tribal territory. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
22. In the late nineteenth century, the relationship between tribal governments and
the federal government changed, as the absolute authority of Congress over American
Indian tribal nations was articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Kagama, which held that Congress has plenary authority over American Indian tribal
nations. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). As an expression of its plenary authority over Indian country,
on June 18, 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), Pub. L. No. 73-383,
48 Stat. 984 (1934), with the partial purpose of increasing local tribal self-government.
Mescalero Apache v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) ("The intent and purpose of the
Reorganization Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance
to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism."') (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 73-1804, at 6 (1934); Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and
the Race Versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 CAL. L. REv. 801, fn. 40 (2008) ("Congress
enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2000), which had as its
purpose the need to craft measures "whereby Indian tribes would be able to assume a
greater degree of self-government.") (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974));
Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts,
1 (1998), available at http://www.icctc.org/CC%20manual/Lessons%2OFrom%20the%20
Third%20Sovereign.pdf. ("Passage of the Indian Reorganization Act allowed the tribes to
organize their governments, by drafting their own constitutions, adopting their own laws
through tribal councils, and setting up their own court systems.").
23. For example, see the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which applied many of the
protections of the U.S. Constitution to Indian country as well as limiting American Indian
tribal court punishment authority to $5,000 and/or one year in prison. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03
(2006). See also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that
American Indian tribal courts do not have authority over non-Indians in criminal matters).
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handled by American Indian tribal courts include largely intra-tribal
matters,2 4 especially issues of property and family law raised by mem-
bers of the tribe.2 5 This is consistent with the general policy of the
American federal government to leave issues related to American In-
dian tribal members solely within the inherent tribal sovereignty of
tribal governments. 2 6 Furthermore, "[in the modern era, as tribes
have increasingly assumed governmental functions formerly per-
formed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service, the
relationship between the federal government and the tribes is often
described as a government-to-government relationship."2 7
As a result of the unique legal history very briefly explained
above, environmental justice claims arising from within Indian coun-
try include not only racial considerations, but also political
considerations, as American Indian tribes have a special government-
to-government relationship with the federal government. 2 8 The addi-
tional consideration of tribal sovereignty is crucial to any discussion of
environmental justice claims arising in Indian country, and the appli-
cation of Title VI, as explained below.
The preceding discussion leads to a natural question: given the
increasing use of Title VI to address concerns related to environmental
justice and the unique contours of Indian country, does Title VI apply
24. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land &
Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (holding that although American Indian tribal courts have
jurisdiction to regulate conduct on tribal lands, that power is lost once the land is
transferred to non-Indians); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding
that American Indian tribal courts possess civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian
land when the non-Indians either enter into a consensual relationship with the plaintiff
allowing for tribal court jurisdiction or when the non-Indians' activities threaten the health,
welfare, economic security or political integrity of the tribe).
25. Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian
Tribal Courts, 22 Am. INDiAN L. REv. 285, 308 (1998).
26. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1932) (holding that the laws of
Georgia did not have any effect within the Cherokee Nation's territory); Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that tribes have the power to determine tribal
membership).
27. Daniel Cordalis and Dean B. Suagee, The Effects of Climate Change on American
Indian and Alaska Native Tribes, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 45 (2008) (citing Exec. Order
No. 13,175, 2, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000)). See also 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006) ("there is
a government-to-government relationship between the United States and each Indian tribe
.") (alteration in original).
28. Additionally, individual American Indians have a political relationship with their
tribal governments. Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle
and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARz. ST. L. J. 25,
27 (1997).
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to environmental justice claims arising in Indian country?29 The an-
swer is likely yes and no. In addressing this question, this article
considers potential Title VI claims brought against tribal govern-
ments.30 Section I concludes that Title VI claims likely cannot be
brought against federally-recognized tribal governments and entities
controlled by tribal governments. In reaching this conclusion, Section I
considers situations where the tribal government is acting under
"Tribes-As-States" ("TAS") provisions of environmental statutes, 1 and
where the matter at issue is not wholly intratribal in nature. In all
instances, Section I concludes that it is unlikely a potential claimant
would prevail on a Title VI claim against a federally-recognized tribe.
Section II goes on to consider whether the same claimant would be suc-
cessful in bringing a Title VI claim against a non-tribal entity
operating within Indian country. Under these conditions, Section II
concludes that a potential claimant may be able to bring a Title VI
claim against a non-tribal governmental entity. The reason for the
contrary result can be found in the underlying purpose of exempting
tribal governments from the Civil Rights Act, of which Title VI is a
part. In exempting tribal governments from the Civil Rights Act, it
appears that Congress meant to remove any obstacle to tribal economic
stability and success. In other words, the key factor in determining
whether the Civil Rights Act, and Title VI in particular, applies is tri-
bal sovereignty. Therefore, this article begins by considering
29. Notably, Title VI itself is silent as to whether or not it should be applied against
tribes. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d- 2000d-1 (2006). Moreover, agency guidance, such as EPA
regulations related to Title VI, does not provide any clarification. Colopy, supra note 2, at
174-75 ("'Recipients' [under Title VI regulations] are defined as any state government or
political subdivision, any public or private entity, or any other person receiving the financial
assistance . . . .") (citation omitted). In notable part, EPA's website says "[t]he issue of the
applicability of Title VI to Federally-recognized tribes is currently under review at EPA."
EPA, Civil Rights: Policies and Guidance, http://www.epa.gov/ocr/polguid.htm. (last visited
March 10, 2011) (alteration in original).
30. This article uses the terms "complaint" and "claims" under Title VI to signal that
individuals may bring complaints directly to federal agencies. Monette, supra note 6, at
722-23 ("The regulations allow any person to file a Title VI discrimination complaint with
the EPA's Office of Civil Rights against a recipient of EPA assistance."); see also e.g. Colopy,
supra note 2, at 178 ("If a complaintant does choose to take her case directly to the EPA, she
must file her complaint within 180 calendar days of the discriminatory act, or obtain an
OCR waiver of the time restriction for 'good cause.' The OCR must decide within twenty
days whether to accept or reject the complaint, or refer it to another agency. If the
complaint is accepted, the OCR allows the applicant or recipient an opportunity to respond
and attempts to informally resolve the dispute by convincing the party to voluntarily comply
with the agency's Title VI requirements.") (citations omitted).
31. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (2006), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e) (2006), Safe Water Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (2006), Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006), and major portions of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (2006).
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Congress's intent in exempting federally-recognized tribes from appli-
cation of the Civil Rights Act.
I. TITLE VI CLAIMs AGAINST FEDERALLY-RECOGNIZED TRIBES
ARE LIKELY BARRED
This Section considers whether Title VI claims may be brought
against federally-recognized tribes and tribal enterprises largely con-
trolled by tribal government. In reaching the conclusion that Title VI
claims cannot be brought against federally-recognized tribal nations,
this Section also considers whether the same is true if the tribe is act-
ing under TAS authority and whether the same is true if the Title VI
claim involves matters that are not wholly intra-tribal. However,
before looking at these sub-issues it is helpful to first analyze the issue
broadly by considering the legal justification for passage of the overall
Civil Rights Act, as well as Congress's likely purpose in exempting
tribes from application of the Civil Rights Act.
Professor Richard Monette has already published an excellent
piece considering the legal foundations underlying the passage of the
Civil Rights Act, and based on the underlying legal foundations,
whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act applies to Indian country. 32
Because Professor Monette has already conducted a thorough analysis
of the relevant constitutional law likely applicable, including the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Spending Clause,
this article will not duplicate his work. Ultimately, Professor Monette
concludes that "none of these constitutional provisions justify applica-
tion of Title VI to Indian Tribes."33
In addition to an extensive discussion of whether these constitu-
tional principles apply in Indian country, Professor Monette also
32. Monette, supra note 6, at 721.
33. Id. at 727. For example, in relevant part, Professor Monette explains that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not apply to Indian country. Id. at
740 ("Indeed, as recently as 1978, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to tribes.. . . Simply, if the Fourteenth Amendment is the sole
constitutional authority for Title VI, it cannot apply to tribes."). Similarly, Professor
Monette points out that it is unclear whether the commerce clause is the legal foundation of
Title VI, and there must be clarity to affect tribal sovereignty as invocation of Title VI would
clearly affect the sovereignty of tribal nations. Id. at 742-43 ("If the Commerce Clause can
be deemed to have been invoked in Title VI to apply the Civil Rights Act to tribes, questions
remain regarding whether Congress did in fact invoke the Clause and whether Congress
applied the Act to tribes. Such an abrogation of state sovereignty must be 'unmistakably
clear. . . . At least one court summarily dismissed Title VI's application to tribes on these
grounds, stating that tribes ' are subject to federal laws only when Congress expressly so
declares."').
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buttresses his conclusions regarding the applicability of Title VI to
tribes by turning to federal Indian law. Professor Monette explains
that "[iin general, the case law held that general federal laws would
not apply to Tribes unless Congress made such intentions express.
Further, if federal law would abrogate the sovereignty of the Tribes
itself, such an intention would have to be 'unmistakably clear."'3 4
Moreover, Professor Monette pointed out that, "the Supreme Court
ruled that the Federal Bill of Rights did not apply to tribes and thus
did not prohibit discrimination by tribes."3 5 Therefore, even if one
were to argue that the protections of the federal Bill of Rights through
application of the Indian Civil Rights Act applied in Indian country, it
would not be possible to pursue a Title VI claim against a tribe unless
the tribe had expressly waived its sovereign immunity to allow such
suits. 36
Beyond the fact that the constitutional law underlying Title VI
is likely inapplicable to federally-recognized tribes, the conclusion that
Title VI claims cannot be brought against federally-recognized tribes is
buttressed by looking at EPA regulations related to Title VI and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. Under EPA regulations related to Title VI,
an individual may file a Title VI complaint against a recipient of EPA
assistance.
Of course, Tribes receive such assistance from the EPA under sev-
eral other statutory authorizations. The regulations, however, do
not expressly include Tribes in their definition of "recipients." One
might surmise that this was not a mere oversight, but recognition
of the Tribes' sovereignty and recognition that Title VI does not ap-
ply to them. The regulations do, however, expressly include
American Indians in the definition of "Racial Classification.37
Notably, the EPA regulations seem to draw a distinction between the
application of Title VI to tribes and its application to individual Indi-
ans. Here, the EPA regulations may be read to suggest that Title VI
does not apply against tribes, but may be utilized by individual Indi-
ans. This distinction is consistent with this article's conclusion that
Title VI does not apply against tribes and tribally-controlled entities,
while individual Indians may bring Title VI claims against non-tribal
entities on and off the reservation.
34. Id. at 739 (citations omitted) (alternation in original).
35. Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
36. Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Authority, 268 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59, ("[S]uits against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by
its sovereign immunity from suit.")).
37. Monette, supra note 6, at 723 (citations omitted).
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Moreover, guidance provided by EPA may be helpful in further
beginning to understand whether Title VI applies to tribes.
On February 5, 1998, the EPA issued an Interim Guidance Memo-
randum to guide the Office of Civil Rights in processing Title VI
administrative complaints, without consulting Tribes. However,
the Interim Guidance memorandum is largely silent regarding
Tribes, except for one footnote that addresses the applicability of
Title VI to Tribes, and it speaks volumes: "Title VI applies to Tribes
as EPA recipients only when the statutory provision authorizing
the Federal financial assistance is not exclusively for the benefit of
Tribes. Otherwise, Tribes are exempt from Title VI."3 8
This Interim Guidance clearly supports the position that Title VI gen-
erally does not apply to tribes and may only apply in the very limited
situation of when federal assistance is exclusively for the benefit of
tribes. It is uncertain as to whether a situation would occur where the
federal assistance at issue would be exclusively for the benefit of tribes
or a single tribe.
Further, historical materials suggest that Title VI was not
meant to be applied against tribes. On December 2, 1963, Nicholas
Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General for the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, responded to what must have been a request from Congressman
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee
on the Judiciary, for a list of programs and activities that involve fed-
eral financial assistance within the scope of Title VI of the then
proposed civil rights bill, H.R. 7152.39 In response to this request, Kat-
zenbach stated that "[p]rograms of assistance to Indians are also
omitted. Indians have a special status under the Constitution and
treaties. Nothing in title VI is intended to change that status or to
preclude special assistance to Indians."40 Interestingly, Katzenbach
did not limit his conclusion to just tribes, but rather stated that Title
VI was not intended to apply to Indians generally. This suggests that
the inability to apply Title VI may be broader than just claims against
tribes. However, given the EPA's regulations and guidance discussed
above, it is more likely that it was Congress's intent to limit the appli-
cation of Title VI as against tribes. To infer otherwise, would be to
read a broad exception into Title VI, that Indians whether on or off the
reservation are exempt from application of Title VI, and there is no
38. Id. (citing Tribal Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints
Challenging Permits, n. 3 (last visited June 6, 1999); http://es.epa.gov/oeca/oej/titlevilhtml).
39. Letter from Nicholas Katzenbach, U.S. Department of Justice Deputy Attorney
General, to Congressman Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary, 110 Cong. Rec. 13380 (June 10, 1964).
40. Id.(alteration in original).
224
2011 APPLICATION OF TITLE VI IN INDIAN COUNTRY
explicit congressional statement to support such an inference. Addi-
tionally, as discussed below, it seems more likely that Congress
intended to exempt tribes from application of Title VI in order to pro-
tect essential governmental functions. Such essential tribal
governmental functions would not come into play in regards to the ac-
tions of individual Indians.
In discussing whether Title VI applies to tribes, it is also helpful
to look to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for comparison. Although not
an ideal comparison given Title VII explicitly exempts tribes, 4 1 such a
comparison is helpful because both Title VI and Title VII are contained
within the Civil Rights Act, and it may be suggested that Congress
would have intended the same result through both Titles of the Act.
Moreover, examining Title VII case law is helpful because several
courts have considered whether Title VII applies against tribes,
whereas little if any case law exists regarding the application of Title
VI to tribes.
In Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Authority, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the application of Title VII
to the actions of a tribal housing authority.42 Although not a tribal
government, "[t]he AHA [Akwesasne Housing Authority] was created
pursuant to a resolution of the St. Regis Tribal Council. It provides
public housing on the Akwesasne Reservation using federal funds dis-
bursed by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development." In relevant part, the court explained that "[a]s a mat-
ter of federal common law, an Indian tribe enjoys sovereign immunity
from suit except where 'Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe
has waived its immunity."' 4 3 Furthermore, the court explained that
the tribe itself may waive its sovereign immunity, but such a waiver
must be explicit and must include an indication of where (i.e., in what
venue) the tribe agrees to be sued. 4 4 The court ultimately determined
that because the tribal housing agency functioned as a branch of the
tribal government, the tribe's sovereign immunity applied to the activi-
ties of the tribal housing agency.45 Therefore, because the tribal
housing authority was cloaked in the tribe's sovereign immunity, there
must have been either a clear congressional or tribal waiver of the
tribe's sovereign immunity to allow the tribal housing agency to be
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
42. Garcia, 268 F.3d at 76.
43. Id. at 84 (citing Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754(1998); Bassett v.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 356-57 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original).
44. Id. at 86 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 87.
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sued under Title VII. Finding no such waiver by either Congress or the
Tribe, the court determined that the Title VII claim against the tribal
housing agency could not move forward.46 Given that the Second Cir-
cuit seemed to focus on the tribe's sovereign immunity in determining
whether a Title VII claim could be brought against the tribal housing
agency, it would seem that the same analysis would be equally applica-
ble to claims brought against tribes under Title VI.
In Duke v. Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Au-
thority, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered a
case very similar to the one considered by the Second Circuit in Garcia
v. Akwesasne Housing Authority.47 In Duke, an employee also brought
a Title VII claim against the tribal housing authority. Unlike the tri-
bal housing agency at issue in Garcia, however, the tribal housing
authority at issue in Duke was created under state law.4 8 The question
before the Tenth Circuit then was whether the tribal housing authority
was still a branch of the tribe, given it was created under state law,
and therefore exempt from the application of Title VII. In determining
whether the tribal housing authority should be exempt, the court con-
sidered the level of tribal control over the entity and whether the entity
advanced the economic interests of the tribal government.49 The court
further explained that any ambiguities should be resolved in favor of
advancing "Indian sovereignty."5 0 In responding to the plaintiffs claim
that the Tribe's decision to organize the tribal housing authority under
state laws amounted to an affirmative choice by the Tribe to subject
the tribal housing authority to state and federal laws, the court ex-
plained that "[in the absence of an express declaration to this effect,
we are reluctant to impute such an intent to the tribe."51 Taking the
foregoing in totality, the court determined that the tribal housing au-
thority did constitute a tribe and that there was no express statement
by the Tribe of its willingness to be subjected to state and federal laws,
despite the fact that the tribal housing authority was organized under
state law. 5 2 Accordingly, the exemption for tribes under Title VII ap-
plied and the plaintiffs Title VII claim was therefore not applicable
against the tribal housing authority.
46. Id.
47. Duke, 199 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1999).
48. Id. at 1124.
49. Id. at 1125.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1125-26 (alteration in original).
52. Id. at 1126.
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The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Duke is helpful in understand-
ing whether Title VI applies against tribes for several reasons. First,
the court suggested that the reason for the explicit exemption of tribes
from application of Title VII is to advance the economic stability of tri-
bal governments.53 If this was Congress's purpose in exempting tribes
from application of Title VII, it would seem that the same analysis
would apply in considering the application of Title VI. Moreover, the
Tenth Circuit seemed to agree with the Second Circuit in Garcia that
any waiver of tribal sovereign immunity or tribal desire to have state
and federal law applied against the tribe must be explicit and should
not be imputed to the tribe, even where the tribe organizes a tribal
entity under state law.5 4 In the context of Title VI, it would therefore
seem that there must be an explicit statement from either Congress or
a tribe that Title VI applies before such an application may occur. Fi-
nally, the Tenth Circuit applied the general principle of federal Indian
law that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of advancing tribal
sovereignty in context of Title VII.5 5 At best, it is ambiguous whether
Title VI applies against tribes. Given this ambiguity, the question
should be resolved in favor of advancing tribal sovereignty. Because
Title VI would likely negatively impact the stability of tribal govern-
ment, Title VI should therefore not apply against tribes.56
In Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also considered whether a Title VII claim
could be brought against a non-profit corporation created by tribes.57
"Modoc is a nonprofit corporation created and controlled by the Alturas
and Cedarville Rancherias, both federally recognized tribes. Modoc
was 'organized for charitable, educational, and scientific purposes and
such other related purposes . . . relative to the delivery of certain ser-
vices pursuant to [the Indian Self-Determination Act].' "58 In
53. Id. at 1125.
54. Id. at 1125-26.
55. Id. at 1125.
56. Admittedly, an argument may be made that if a tribe is perceived as not enforcing
civil rights within its jurisdiction this may negatively impact the tribe's sovereignty. This
may be the case if outside entities refuse to conduct business within the tribe's jurisdiction
because of perceived tribal civil rights abuses or perhaps if the tribal community becomes
disgruntled as a result of failure to protect against civil rights abuses. Whether application
of the Civil Rights Act in Indian country, specifically Title VI and Title VII, is ultimately a
"good thing" or a "bad thing" for tribal sovereignty is therefore a question broader than the
scope of this article. For purposes of this article, the logic advanced by the court decisions
discussed, that imposition of Title VII would be "bad" for tribal sovereignty, is ultimately
pursued.
57. Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, 157 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).
58. Id. at 1187 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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determining whether Modoc qualified as an "Indian tribe" for purposes
of exempting it from application of Title VII, the court noted that "the
purpose of the tribal exemption, like the purpose of sovereign immu-
nity itself, was to promote the ability of Indian tribes to control their
own enterprises."59 Ultimately, the court concluded that Modoc served
as "an arm of the sovereign tribes" and was therefore exempt from ap-
plication of Title VII.60
Pink differed from the cases discussed above because the plain-
tiff argued that Modoc's actions extended beyond the reservation's
boundaries and therefore Title VII should apply to the off-reservation
activities. In relevant part, the court explained that "Congress did not
limit the scope of tribal sovereign immunity, as such, the tribes retain
the extraterritorial component of sovereign immunity."61 This holding
is important for purposes of considering whether Title VI applies
against tribes. If the court had found that Title VII did apply against
off-reservation impacts, such a holding would suggest that tribes were
only exempt from application of Title VII as within their jurisdictional
territory. In other words, a contrary holding would suggest that ex-
emption from Title VII was directly connected to territorial
sovereignty. In reaching the contrary holding, the court affirmed that
tribes are exempted where their tribal sovereignty is impacted, regard-
less of whether such impacts occur within or outside of Indian country.
This also affirms that the central question in determining whether a
tribe is exempt from Title VI should be whether application of Title VI
would negatively impact tribal sovereignty, and not the extent of the
tribe's territorial sovereignty.
Finally, in Dille v. Council of Energy Resource Tribes, the Tenth
Circuit also considered the application of Title VII against the Council
of Energy Resource Tribes ("CERT"), which, at the time, was a council
comprised of 39 tribes. 62 In particular, the court considered whether
Title VII's exemption for tribes applied to CERT. "CERT is a council
comprised of thirty-nine Indian tribes that have joined together to
manage collectively their energy resources . . . . The member tribes,
then, have exclusive control over the operations of CERT."63 In reach-
ing its decision, the court also reaffirmed the general principle of
federal Indian law that ambiguities are to be resolved "with doubtful
59. Id. at 1188 (citations omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1189.
62. Dille, 801 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1986).
63. Id. at 374.
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expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians."6 4 Notably, the
court also cited legislative history, and in particular, statements from
Senator Mundt, for an understanding of the underlying purpose in ex-
empting tribes from application of Title VII. As Senator Mundt
explained:
This amendment would provide to American Indian tribes in their
capacity as a political entity, the same privileges accorded to the
U.S. Government and its political subdivisions, to conduct their
own affairs and economic activities without consideration of the
provisions of the bill. Let me emphasize that Indian tribes in an
effort to decrease unemployment and it order to integrate their peo-
ple into the affairs of the national community, operate many
economic enterprises, which are more or less supervised by the In-
dian tribes, the employees serving as apprentices in many
instances, and as supervisors and regularly employed and paid em-
ployees in others.65
"Senator Mundt's comments show that the purpose of this exemption
was to promote the ability of sovereign Indian tribes to control their
own economic enterprises."6 6 Ultimately, the court concluded that the
Title VII exemption applied to CERT, as it was engaged in essential
economic functions on behalf of the member tribes and the member
tribes maintained control over the council. Specifically, "[t]he creation
of CERT to advance the economic conditions of its thirty-nine member
tribes is precisely the type of activity that Congress sought to en-
courage by exempting Indian tribes from requirements of Title VII."67
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Dille, which is buttressed by the
legislative history behind the exemption for tribes from Title VII,68
makes clear that the purpose of exempting tribes from application of
Title VII is to promote the economic interests of the tribes. This same
analysis is equally applicable when considering whether Title VI ap-
plies against tribes. It seems logical that if Congress intended to
exempt tribes from application of Title VII to promote the economic
interests of tribes, so too would Congress intend the same regarding
the application of Title VI, as to conclude otherwise would seem to di-
rectly contradict Congress's intent. If Congress exempted tribes from
64. Id. at 375 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 149 (1984)).
65. Id. at 375 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 13702 (1964)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See D. Michael McBride and H. Leonard Court, Labor Regulation, Union Avoidance
and Organized Labor Relations Strategies on Tribal Lands: New Indian Gaming Strategies
in the Wake of San Manuel Band of Indians v. National Labor Relations Board, 40 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1259, 1267 n. 41 (2007).
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application of Title VII but then meant for Title VI to apply against
tribes, the economic interests of tribes would be threatened by applica-
tion of Title VI. This is exactly what Congress meant to avoid by
exempting tribes from application of Title VII.
The conclusion that Congress did not intend Title VI to apply
against tribes because it would potentially disrupt essential tribal gov-
ernment functions in consistent with general principles of federal
Indian law. Generally, state and federal law will not apply in Indian
country if such an imposition would negatively affect tribal self-govern-
ance. 69 Therefore, having concluded that Title VI is generally
inapplicable to federally-recognized tribes, this article considers
whether the analysis changes when tribes are acting under TAS provi-
sions or where the matter as issue is not wholly intra-tribal in nature.
a. Application of Title VI to Tribes Acting Under TAS Status
Much of modern day American environmental law is premised
on the idea of cooperative federalism, where the states are responsible
for ensuring compliance with federal regulations. Several of the major
environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water
Act, have TAS provisions that allow for federally-recognized tribes to
act as a state in implementing federal environmental statutes in In-
dian country. 70 Many environmental justice claims are brought
against states and state agencies.71 The natural question then be-
comes: if tribes are acting as states under the TAS provisions of some
environmental statutes, must they submit to Title VI when acting in
that capacity? The answer is likely no.
Moreover, there may be some suggestion that tribes are acting
through a delegation of federal law when acting under the TAS provi-
sions of certain environmental statutes. In Arizona Public Service
Company v. Environmental Protection Agency, the court was asked to
consider in part whether Congress expressly delegated to tribes au-
thority to regulate air quality on all land, including land held in fee by
69. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960).
70. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (2006), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e) (2006), Safe Water Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (2006), Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006), and major portions of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (2006).
71. Colopy, supra note 2, at 156 ("Most environmental justice suits under Title VI are
likely to be against a state agency. State, county, and local agencies that receive federal
funds are often responsible for the siting of landfills. These agencies also enforce state
environmental laws and regulations with the aid of federal funds.").
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non-members of the tribe, under the TAS provisions of the Clean Air
Act. 7 2 In arguing that tribes had the authority to so regulate under the
TAS provisions of the Clean Air Act, the EPA apparently argued that
the TAS provisions contained within the 1990 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act constituted a delegation of federal authority to tribes.73
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, when the Clean Air Act TAS provisions were added to the stat-
ute, indicates a congressional belief that TAS status constituted an
express delegation of federal authority to tribes.74 If tribes acting
under TAS status are therefore able to regulate because the TAS sta-
tus constitutes a delegation of federal authority to the individual tribe,
one may wonder whether this changes the analysis above. Accord-
ingly, when tribes are acting under TAS status and assuming such
status constitutes a delegation of federal authority to the tribes, does
Title VI apply against tribes acting in such a capacity?
Even when tribes are acting under TAS status, it is likely that
Title VI still is not applicable. Notably, there was a belief that Title VI
was not meant to apply to activities wholly carried out by the United
States with federal funds.75 Accordingly, even assuming TAS status
amounts to a delegation of federal authority to tribes, it would seem
logical that if the United States is not included within the ambit of
Title VI when it carries out activities using its own funds, then so too
would Title VI be inapplicable to tribes carrying on the same activities
under a delegation of federal authority. This conclusion is buttressed
by the analysis above that Title VI generally does not apply against
tribes and entities controlled by tribal governments, because Congress
did not want to interfere with the governmental functions of said
72. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
73. Id.
74. Report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, A Legislative History
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 5 ENV'T AND NATURAL RES. POL'Y Div. 8338, 8419
(1998) ("Thus, new section 328(a) of the Act constitutes an express delegation of power to
Indian tribes to administer and enforce the Clean Air Act in Indian lands, as Indian tribes
were delegated the power to administer and enforce the Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean
Water Act.") (citing Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, U.S., 492 U.S. 408,
426-30 (1989)).
75. Letter from Nicholas Katzenbach, U.S. Department of Justice Deputy Attorney
General, to Congressman Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary, 110 CONG. REC. 13380 (June 10, 1964) ("Activities wholly
carried out by the United States with Federal funds . . . are not included in the list. Such
activities, being wholly owned by, and operated by or for, the United States, cannot fairly be
described as receiving Federal 'assistance.' While they may result in general economic
benefit to neighboring communities, such benefit is not considered to be financial assistance
to a program or activity within the meaning of title VI.") (citation omitted).
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tribes.76 Moreover, as previously explained, tribes generally enjoy im-
munity from suit unless either the tribe or Congress has explicitly
waived tribal sovereign immunity.77
b. Application of Title VI Against Tribes Where the Matter at Issue
is an Intra-tribal Matter
As can be inferred from the analysis above, the argument that
Title VI does not apply against a tribe or an entity that is controlled by
and promotes the sovereign interests of the tribe is perhaps its strong-
est when the matter at issue involves an intra-tribal issue. The
question therefore arises whether the foregoing analysis applies
equally to environmental justice concerns related to tribal govern-
ments when such concerns are not wholly intra-tribal. More simply
stated, would tribes still be exempted from Title VI when their actions
have implications beyond their jurisdictions or if a non-member where
to bring a Title VI claim against the tribe?
The answer is likely yes. As described in detail above, EPA reg-
ulations and historical guidance seem to suggest that the federal
government did not intend for Title VI to apply against tribes. Neither
the regulations nor guidance suggest that such a conclusion is limited
to actions taken by tribes that are wholly intra-tribal in nature. More-
over, the case law regarding application of Title VII against tribes is
particularly instructive on this point. For example, in Dille v. Council
of Energy Resource Tribes, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Title VII
did not apply to the actions of CERT, even when those actions were
76. At least in regard to the Clean Air Act, the TAS provisions were explicitly adopted
to promote tribal self-government. Report of the Committee on Environment and Public
Works, A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 5 ENv'T AND
NATuRAL RES. POL'Y Div. 8338, 8419 (1998) ("The purpose of new section 238 of the Act is to
improve the environmental quality of the air within Indian country in a manner consistent
with the EPA Indian Policy and "the overall Federal position in support of Tribal self-
government and the government-to-government relations between Federal and Tribal
Governments," as stated in the document EPA Policy for the Administration of
Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations, Nov. 8, 1984."). Although this legislative
history is specific to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the Report indicates that
another purpose of the amendment is to grant tribes the same powers they already
possessed under the Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Water Act. Id. It may therefore be
asserted that the justification for TAS provisions under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act
and the Safe Water Drinking Act is the same.
77. Garcia, 268 F.3d at 84 (citing Kiowa Tribe , 523 U.S. at 754; Bassett, 204 F.3dat
356-57). Moreover, "[c]ongressional abrogation of tribal immunity, like congressional
abrogation of other forms of sovereign immunity, 'cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed." Id. at 85 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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occurring outside of Indian country.78 As previously discussed, the
court focused its analysis on whether the actions of CERT promoted
the sovereignty, and, in particular, economic interests, of the tribes.
Therefore, the ultimate factor in determining whether Title VI applies
is not the land or membership status of potential plaintiffs, but rather
whether the application of Title VI would negatively impact tribal sov-
ereignty. The Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all concluded
that application of Title VII against tribes would negatively impact tri-
bal sovereignty, and it may be reasonably inferred that Title VI would
have the same negative impact. Therefore, it is likely that tribes are
exempt from Title VI, even when the environmental justice matter at
issue is not wholly intra-tribal in nature.
II. TITLE VI CLAiMs ARISING IN INDIAN COUNTRY BUT NOT
BROUGHT AGAINST TRIBES
Given the foregoing conclusion that the essential factor in de-
termining whether Title VI applies to complaints against tribes is its
potential impact on tribal sovereignty, is the same conclusion reached,
when the complaints do not involve tribal sovereignty? In other words,
can Title VI claims be brought against non-tribal governmental enti-
ties when the actions of such entities raise environmental justice
concerns within Indian country?
Yet again, consideration of courts' application of Title VII to
non-tribal entities conducting business within Indian country may be
helpful in determining whether Title VI applies. In Title VII claims
brought against non-tribal entities conducting business within Indian
country, it appears that courts have generally applied Title VII against
non-tribal entities. In fact, "[flederal courts . . . have consistently ap-
plied Title VII to non-Indian held entities within Indian country,
despite the inherent sovereignty tribes retain within Indian country
pursuant to the rule reaffirmed in Montana v. United States-that non-
Indians who have entered into consensual relations with a tribe are
subject to tribal jurisdiction."79
78. Dille, 801 F.2d at 376. It is unclear from the court's discussion whether the
plaintiffs in Dille were members of the tribes composing CERT. From the court's silence, it
may be inferred that the membership status of the plaintiffs is irrelevant to the ultimate
question of whether Title VII applied.
79. Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, De Facto Judicial Preemption of Tribal Labor and
Employment Law, 2008 MIcH. ST. L. REv. 435, 443 (2008); see also McBride, supra note 67
("When non-Indian employers have engaged in commerce within Indian country, courts
have found Title VII to apply.") (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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To understand why this is the case, it is helpful to look at the
analysis underlying some of these court decisions. In Tidwell v. Har-
rah's Kansas Casino Corporation, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas considered a Title VII claim brought by a non-mem-
ber against a casino, which was a non-Indian corporation but had
entered into a gaming-related compact with a federally-recognized
tribe, the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation.80 The majority of the
Court's analysis focused on whether the tribal exhaustion doctrine ap-
plied to the matter,81 meaning that the case should be first considered
in tribal court before its consideration in federal court.82 In reaching
its decision, the Court provided helpful analysis on the issue of
whether Title VII claims, such as the one at issue in this case, impact
tribal sovereignty. In response to the casino's arguments that tribal
sovereignty concerns were implicated in the case, the Court explained
that it is "difficult to discern what sovereignty concerns are threatened
by [P]laintiff's suit. Her suit is between two non-Indian entities and
plainly involves issues of federal law. The only connection with the
tribe is the casino's location on the reservation."13 Furthermore, the
court explained that "[t]his case does not present a classic 'reservation
affair,' it is a dispute between two non-tribal members arising under
federal law, which took place in a casino owned by a nonmember. The
mere fact that the casino is located on the reservation does not convert
this dispute to into 'reservation affair."' 84 Therefore, it logically follows
from the court's reasoning that tribal sovereignty is not impacted by
the existence of a non-tribal entity conducting business within its juris-
diction. In fact, the court confirmed this conclusion by continuing on to
say that "Plaintiffs case does not touch upon tribal self government; it
80. Tidwell v. Harrah's Kan. Casino Corp., 322 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1202 (D. Kan. 2004)
("Harrah's is a non-Indian entity that is located entirely on the Potawatomi reservation.
Plaintiff, who is not a tribal member, is a United States citizen residing in Hoyt, Kansas,
which is outside of the Potawatomi reservation. Harrah's operates the casino pursuant to
an Operating Agreement it entered into with the Potawatomi Indian Nation, and the
operation of the casino is conducted under the terms of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
and the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation-Kansas Gaming Compact (Compact).").
81. Id. at 1203 (explaining the tribal exhaustion doctrine) ("[T]he Court (in Nat'l
Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians held that the question of whether
tribal courts have jurisdiction over a matter involving non-Indians in civil cases should first
be addressed in tribal courts. In Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, the Supreme
Court further explained that '[tiribal sovereignty over the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.' Thus, civil jurisdiction over
actions on reservation lands lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a
specific treaty or provision or federal statute.") (citations omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1204 (alteration in original).
84. Id. at 1206 (alteration in original).
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does not involve injury to tribal members, a challenge to a tribal policy,
the regulation of reservation lands, or even implicate tribal law."85
Although the court in Tidwell was specifically addressing the
question of whether the tribal exhaustion doctrine applied, its analysis
regarding the impacts of a Title VII claim brought against a non-tribal
entity, here a casino operating within the reservation, is helpful be-
cause the court concluded that such claims do not implicate tribal
sovereignty. Given tribal sovereignty appears to be the central deter-
mining issue as to whether the Civil Rights Act, and specifically Titles
VI and VII, applies the Tidwell court's analysis supports the conclusion
that Title VI claims may be brought against non-tribal entities operat-
ing within Indian country, assuming tribal sovereignty is not
implicated by such claims.
In Vance v. Boyd Mississippi Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi considered a similar case to the matter
at issue in Tidwell.86 In Vance, the plaintiff was a non-member work-
ing for the company, Boyd, which managed a casino owned by a
federally-recognized tribe and located on the tribe's reservation. 7 As
in Tidwell, the defendant in Vance argued that the tribal exhaustion
doctrine applied and therefore the matter should have first been de-
cided by tribal court before being heard in federal court. The Vance
court provided ample analysis as to why the tribal exhaustion doctrine
did not apply. The Court neither discussed, nor concluded, that the
Plaintiffs claim would implicate tribal sovereignty. Like the Tidwell
court, the Vance court ultimately determined that federal court was
the proper forum because "this is an action for Title VII discrimination
between non-Indians involving only issues of federal law ....
Finally, in Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Manufacturing Corpora-
tion, the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota
considered a claim which encompassed a Title VII claim brought by an
Indian against a corporation that was 51 % owned by a federally-recog-
nized tribe, Devils Lake Sioux Tribe.89 Myrick differs from Tidwell and
Vance in two notable respects. First, the Plaintiff was an Indian. Sec-
85. Id.
86. Vance v. Boyd Miss., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
87. Id. at 907.
88. Id. at 914.
89. Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Mfg. Corp., 718 F. Supp. 753, 753 (Dist. N.D. 1989)
("Plaintiff Frank Myrick is a 64 year old American Indian male, who resides at St. Michael,
North Dakota, on the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation. Defendant Devils Lake Sioux
Manufacturing Corporation (DLSMC) is incorporated under the laws of the State of North
Dakota. The Devils Like Sioux Tribe owns 51% of DLSMC, and Brunswick Corporation, a
Delaware corporation owns the other 49%.").
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ond, the Defendant, Devils Lake Sioux Manufacturing Corporation,
was majority owned by a federally-recognized tribe. Yet, the Myrick
court applied largely the same analysis as the courts applied in Tidwell
and Vance. First, the Myrick court summarily dismissed Defendant's
argument that Title VII did not apply against it, arguing that given a
tribe possessed the majority interest in the corporation the tribal ex-
emption discussed above should apply.90 Like the Tidwell and Vance
courts, the Myrick court considered whether the tribal exhaustion doc-
trine applied, allowing the tribal court to consider the matter first. In
discussing the potential application of the tribal exhaustion doctrine,
the Myrick court distinguished the case before it from other cases
where the tribal exhaustion doctrine was applied, finding that the
other cases involved matters "intimately related to tribal self-govern-
ment" and involving an "internal tribal controversy".9' Conversely, in
the matter at hand, the court apparently determined that tribal self-
government was not at issue given the tribe was not a party and the
case "predominantly present[ed] issues of federal law."92
Given the Myrick court's analysis, it may therefore be concluded
that Title VII applies even in a case where the plaintiff is an Indian
and a federally-recognized tribe owns a majority share of the defendant
corporation. As discussed above, it appears that the only situation
where Title VII will not apply in Indian country is when a tribe or tri-
bally-controlled business directly affecting the economic stability of the
tribe is a party. The justification for this exception is that Title VII
should not be applied so as to threaten tribal sovereignty and economic
development.
Notably, all three of the cases focused on whether the tribal ex-
haustion doctrine applied. In Tidwell and Vance, it appears that
neither defendant argued Title VII did not apply.9 3 In Myrick, the as-
sertion that Title VII would not apply was dismissed by the court with
practically no discussion. 94 Given the lack of argumentation and dis-
cussion on this point in all three cases, it can be inferred that there is a
general consensus that Title VII should apply against non-tribal enti-
ties conducting business within Indian country. Therefore, the
90. Id. at 754 ("First, DLSMC argues that plaintiffs Title VII claim should be
dismissed because it falls within the Indian Tribe exception as provided in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) . . . . These arguments are without merit.") (citation omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 755 (alteration in original).
93. Tidwell, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 ("It is undisputed that this Court has federal
question jurisdiction to adjudicate this case, which arises under Title VII.") (citation
omitted); Vance, 923 F. Supp. at 907-08.
94. Myrick, 718 F. Supp. at 754.
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outstanding issue is merely whether federal courts or tribal courts
should be the first to adjudicate such claims. Furthermore, although
both Tidwell and Vance involved Title VII claims brought by non-mem-
ber Indians, the analysis utilized by both courts suggests that, even if
the parties had been member-Indians, at best the Title VII claim would
have first been heard by tribal court. There is nothing in the Courts'
analyses from the three cases discussed above to suggest that Title VII
would not apply to non-tribal entities conducting business in Indian
country.
Again, one cannot make conclusions regarding the application
of Title VI to non-tribal entities based solely on decisions where courts
considered similar application of Title VII, because Title VII explicitly
exempts tribes. However, the underlying analysis in Tidwell, Vance,
and Myrick is persuasive on the point that Title VI claims may be
brought by anyone (i.e., member, non-member or non-Indian) against
an entity conducting business within Indian country as long as applica-
tion of Title VI in such a context would not negatively impact tribal
sovereignty. In Tidwell and Vance, no one raised an argument against
general application of Title VII and in Myrick, the argument was sum-
marily dismissed. In addressing the question of whether the tribal
exhaustion doctrine applied, all three courts concluded that application
of Title VII against the various entities conducting business within In-
dian country was appropriate because such application would not
negatively impact tribal sovereignty. Thus, it appears that the
lynchpin to the analysis of whether provisions of the Civil Rights Act
apply in Indian country is whether tribal sovereignty is affected.
Given most Title VI claims brought against non-tribal entities con-
ducting business in Indian country would unlikely affect tribal
sovereignty, individuals living within Indian country should most
likely be able to bring Title VI claims against on-reservation entities.
III. CONCLUSION
Whether Title VI applies to environmental justice issues arising
in Indian country ultimately turns on how such claims implicate tribal
sovereignty. EPA regulations, guidance and related legislative history
all seem to suggest that Congress did not intend for Title VI to apply
against tribes. This conclusion is also strengthened by the fact that
Title VII, another title of the Civil Rights Act, does not apply against
tribes or tribally-controlled businesses, whose affairs impact tribal sov-
ereignty. This would seem to be the case regardless of whether the
tribe is acting under TAS provisions of the various federal statutes or
237
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 6:2:215
whether issues not wholly intra-tribal in nature are involved. Yet, the
analysis seems somewhat less clear when considering whether Title VI
may be applied against non-tribal entities conducting business within
Indian country. However, Title VII case law can be used for guidance.
Courts have consistently applied Title VII against non-tribal entities
conducting business within Indian country. Under all circumstances,
it appears that the central question is: What impact will application of
Title VI have on tribal sovereignty? If tribal sovereignty will be nega-
tively impacted by application of Title VI, it seems clear that such
claims cannot proceed.
By way of caveat, this article should not be read to mean that
individuals are incapable of protecting themselves against tribal gov-
ernments and entities controlled by tribal governments when
individual civil rights are infringed upon. To the contrary, such indi-
viduals have a cause of action against tribal governments in tribal
court. Civil rights complaints may be brought against tribal govern-
ments and the entities they control under tribal law.9 5 Moreover, the
Indian Civil Rights Act applies the protections of the majority of the
federal Bill of Rights to Indian country.96
Ultimately, when it comes to application of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act to environmental justice issues arising in Indian country,
tribal sovereignty is the key.
95. Monette, supra note 6, at 740 ("Relatively early in this Nation's history, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Bill of Rights did not apply to tribes and thus did not
prohibit discrimination by tribes. In Talton v. Mayes, the Court used language and logic
remarkably similar to that used in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, reasoning that Tribes had
their own constitutions and that their citizens could seek protection there.") (citations
omitted).
96. In language tracking the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA")
grants individual Indians rights against tribal governments. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
(2006). These rights include the free exercise of religion and many of the protections of the
federal criminal process. Id. ICRA also grants individual Indians the right to equal
protection and due process, as well as the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
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